

Nicov 2013

APRIORISMUS A GENEZE ETICKÝCH PRAVIDEL



PÁTEK 10. 5.

Příjezd, setkání u pěnivého moku

SOBOTA 11. 5.

9:30 - 12:30

Blok I: *Ekonomie a etika*

David Lipka: *Do economists need virtues?*

Petr Špecián: *Nihilismus, morální psychologie a ekonomie*

Jitka Melzochová: *Etika a ekonomie*

ODPOLEDNE

Výlet do přírody

OD 19:00

Večerní filosofický klub

Tomáš Kunca: *Hume's science of human nature and foundation of ethics in his A Treatise of Human Nature (Sect. 2.1.11: Of love of fame)*

NEDĚLE 12. 5.

9:30 - 12:30

Blok II: *Filosofie, věda, etika*

Miroslav Svoboda: *Důsledky horizontové teorie Já pro kategoričnost etických soudů*

Ondřej Bečev: *Fenomenologie volního jednání a jeho etické aspekty*

Tomáš Vaverka: *Engliš and Mises*

ODPOLEDNE

Rozchod/odjezd

Anotace

Ing. Ondřej Bečev (MU Brno, FIS VŠE)

Fenomenologie volního jednání a jeho etické aspekty

Příspěvek se bude zabývat tématem jednání a to z pohledu současné kognitivní vědy a filosofie mysli.

Exkurz bude zahájen tématem motorického jednání (*motor agency*), jeho volních a prožitkových aspektů a vnitřní dynamice. Současné postoje v disciplíně budou představeny na argumentech nejvýznamnějších autorů, jakými jsou S. Gallagher, E. Pacherie, P. Haggard, M. Synofzik a G. Vosgerau. To odpovídá výjimečně intenzivní mezioborové spolupráci neuropsychologie a filosofie, kterou se obor vyznačuje. Výklad fenomenologie volního jednání se bude opírat také o aktuálně probíhající polemiku zastánců dvojestupňového modelu (*two-step account of agency*) a klasičtějšího modelu s porovnávači (*comparator model*).

Původním přínosem práce bude, dle mých znalostí vůbec první, vzájemné vymezení a srovnání pojmů *Sense of Agency*, *Feeling of Agency* a *Awareness of Intention*, kteréžto se v mnohém protínají, a doposud nebyly v literatuře explicitně srovnány, ačkoliv leží v samém centru mnoha aktuálně probíhajících výzkumů. Jak upozorňuje např. E. Pacherie, výzkum volního jednání trpí poněkud chaotickou terminologií, která má původ v živelném experimentálním výzkumu.

Závěrem se také pokusím nastínit některé důsledky představených úvah pro etiku a filosofii. Zejména v souvislosti s otázkou mentálního jednání (*mental agency*), pocitu jednání při myšlení, pocitu vlastnictví myšlení a jeho poruch, jakou je např. pocit vnikání cizích myšlenek (*thought insertion*) při schizofrenii.

PhDr. Tomáš Kunca (NF VŠE, FHS UK)

Hume's science of human nature and foundation of ethics in his *A Treatise of Human Nature* (Sect. 2.1.11: Of love of fame)¹

Paper is intended as illustration of the first Hume's attempt to establish moral theory on explanation of sympathy as appears in *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Section 2.1.11 Of love of fame. Textual analysis presupposes insight into Hume's theory of passions and particularly way of his analysis connected with the theory about double impulse or double relation of impressions and ideas, the „hard core“ of his system both in the field of understanding (Book 1) and passions (Book 2). It becomes clear that this foundation of ethics is truly secular and free from theological suppositions.

Ing. David Lipka, Ph.D. (NF VŠE)

Do economists need virtues?

Should economists go back to Adam Smith and enrich their discourse by the concept of virtues? Or is Smithian moral philosophy only redundant obsolete psychology that has no place in modern scientific economics? I

¹ Text k vystoupení je k nalezení v Příloze na konci dokumentu.

will argue that 1) economics cannot flourish without psychology; 2) moral philosophy rooted in virtues is not necessarily inconsistent with modern psychology; and 3) virtues introduce the necessary interpretive element into economics.

Ing. Jitka Melzochová (NF VŠE)

Etika a ekonomie

Je vyloučení etického aspektu lidského jednání nedostatkem pozitivistické ekonomie, jehož důsledkem je slabší predikční schopnost? Závísí blahobyt jedince pouze na jeho spotřebě a jsou jeho cíle tvořeny pouze maximalizací jeho vlastního blahobytu? A. Sen tvrdí, že ekonomie blahobytu může být obohacena přiložením většího důrazu na etiku. Úvahy o motivaci lidského rozhodování mohou dle Sena obohatit jak deskriptivní, tak i prediktivní ekonomii. Podle L. Robbinse je však logicky nemožné etiku a ekonomii spojit. Příspěvek se bude zabývat omezenými možnostmi propojení etiky a ekonomie.

Ing. Miroslav Svoboda (NF VŠE)

Důsledky horizontové teorie Já pro kategoričnost etických soudů

Cílem příspěvku je propojit horizontovou teorii Já a etiku, a poukázat díky tomu na pochybnost tvorby kategorických etických soudů.

Horizontová teorie Já je fenomenologickou analýzou Já, která ukazuje, že hranice mého vědomí mají horizontovou strukturu, že mají podobu světliny. To znamená za prvé, že hranici mezi Já a ne-Já vidím a jasně rozpoznávám vždy jen v části světa („osvětlené“ mým sebeuvědomováním), kdežto za tímto horizontem se hranice mezi Já a ne-Já může měnit, aniž bych to měl pod kontrolou a aniž bych si toho třeba i všiml. Z toho v oblasti etiky plyne, že člověk nemůže s plnou jistotou vynášet kategorické soudy, protože nikdy nezná plně svou osobnost.

Především to ale znamená za druhé, že přechod mezi světlinou (tj. obsahem vědomí) a neosvětlenou (tj. neuvědomovanou) částí světa má povahu horizontu, tedy hranice rozmazané a nezpřesnitelné. Z toho v oblasti etiky vyplývá, že člověk je schopen zastávat třeba i protikladné (zdánlivě) kategorické soudy, protože může polovědomě (tj. na horizontu vědomí) svou světlinou manévrovat tak, aby se vyhnul situaci, kdy by se jejich spor vykázal.

Ing. Petr Špecián (NF VŠE, FHS UK)

Nihilismus, morální psychologie a ekonomie

Příspěvek se bude zabývat Rosenbergovou koncepcí „milého nihilismu“ (*nice nihilism*), který staví na premisách evolučního původu morálních norem a univerzálnosti „jádrové morálky“ (*core morality*). Rosenbergova teorie bude analyzována v kontextu poznatků morální psychologie Jonathana Haidta a pozornost bude věnována především implikacím pro ekonomii, popřípadě pro aplikovanou hospodářskou politiku. Stavět budu na odmítnutí naturalizace etiky, pro kterou argumentuje např. Sam Harris, pokusím se však nalézt alespoň pragmatickou legitimizaci utilitarismu často implicitně přítomného v ekonomickém diskursu.

Mises and Engliš

The aim of this work is to compare Mises's methodological approach in Social science with epistemological work of Czech economist and philosopher Karel Engliš. For this purpose we will use Mises's epistemological stance presented in methodological works – *Epistemological problems of economics*, *The ultimate foundation of economic science: an essay on method and Human Action*. To uncover Engliš's position we will use translated works *Economics: a purpose oriented approach*, *An essay on economic systems; a teleological approach* as well as all epistemological studies published only in Czech or German language.

First, Kantian epistemological shift (apriorism) will be found as ground of both Mises's and Engliš's theoretical system. The paper discusses common aspects of these approaches. These common aspects we explore in comparison of Engliš's logic of purposive thinking with Mises's logic of action and in a methodological question of distinguishing between social and natural science. Finally we discuss the differences in character of purposive thinking and understanding of some particular concepts, such as opportunity cost or usefulness.

Příloha

D. HUME, *A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE: TWO VOLUME SET, VOLUME 1*, THE CLANDERON EDITION OF THE WORKS OF DAVID HUME, D. F. NORTON A M. J. NORTON (EDS.), OXFORD: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2007, S. 253 – 255.

Sect. 11. Of the love of fame

2.1.11.1 But beside these original causes of pride and humility, there is a secondary one in the opinions of others, which has an equal influence on the affections. Our reputation, our character, our name are considerations of vast weight and importance; and even the other causes of pride; virtue, beauty and riches; have little influence, when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others. In order to account for this phaenomenon 'twill be necessary to take some compass, and first explain the nature of sympathy.

2.1.11.2 No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own. This is not only conspicuous in children, who implicitly embrace every opinion propos'd to them; but also in men of the greatest judgment and understanding, who find it very difficult to follow their own reason or inclination, in opposition to that of their friends and daily companions. To this principle we ought to ascribe the great uniformity we may observe in the humours and turn of thinking of those of the same nation; and 'tis much more probable, that this resemblance arises from sympathy, than from any influence of the soil and climate, which, tho' they continue invariably the same, are not able to preserve the character of a nation the same for a century together. A good-natur'd man finds himself in an instant of the same humour with his company; and even the proudest and most surly take a tincture from their countrymen and acquaintance. A chearful countenance infuses a sensible complacency and serenity into my mind; as an angry or sorrowful one throws a sudden dump upon me. Hatred, resentment, esteem, love, courage, mirth and melancholy; all these passions I feel more from communication than from my own natural temper and disposition. So remarkable a phaenomenon merits our attention, and must be trac'd up to its first principles.

2.1.11.3 When any affection is infus'd by sympathy, 'tis at first known only by its effects, and by those external signs in the countenance and conversation, which convey an idea of it. This idea is presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original affection. However instantaneous this change of the idea into an impression may be, it proceeds from certain views and reflections, which will not escape the strict scrutiny of a philosopher, tho' they may be the person himself, who makes them.

2.1.11.4 'Tis evident, that the idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us, and that our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own person, that 'tis not possible to imagine, that any thing can in this particular go beyond it. Whatever object, therefore, is related to ourselves must be conceiv'd with a little vivacity of conception, according to the foregoing principles; and tho' this relation shou'd not be so strong as that of causation, it must still have a considerable influence. Resemblance and contiguity are relations not to be neglected; especially when by an inference from cause and effect, and by the observation of external signs, we are inform'd of the real existence of the object, which is resembling or contiguous.

2.1.11.5 Now 'tis obvious, that nature has preserv'd a great resemblance among all human creatures, and that we never remark any passion or principle in others, of which, in some degree or other, we may not find a parallel in

ourselves. The case is the same with the fabric of the mind, as with that of the body. However the parts may differ in shape or size, their structure and composition are in general the same. There is a very remarkable resemblance, which preserves itself amidst all their variety; and this resemblance must very much contribute to make us enter into the sentiments of others; and embrace them with facility and pleasure. Accordingly we find, that where, beside the general resemblance of our natures, there is any peculiar similarity in our manners, or character, or country, or language, it facilitates the sympathy. The stronger the relation is betwixt ourselves and any object, the more easily does the imagination make the transition, and convey to the related idea the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of our own person.

2.1.11.6 Nor is resemblance the only relation, which has this effect, but receives new force from other relations, that may accompany it. The sentiments of others have little influence, when far remov'd from us, and require the relations of contiguity, to make them communicate themselves entirely. The relations of blood, being a species of causation, may sometimes contribute to the same effect; as also acquaintance, which operates in the same manner with education and custom; as we shall see more fully [Part 2. Sect. 4.] afterwards. All these relations, when united together, convey the impression or consciousness of our own person to the idea of the sentiments or passions of others, and makes us conceive them in the strongest and most lively manner.

2.1.11.7 It has been remark'd in the beginning of this treatise, that all ideas are borrow'd from impressions, and that these two kinds of perceptions differ only in the degrees of force and vivacity, with which they strike upon the soul. The component part of ideas and impressions are precisely alike. The manner and order of their appearance may be the same. The different degrees of their force and vivacity are, therefore, the only particulars, that distinguish them: And as this difference may be remov'd, in some measure, by a relation betwixt the impressions and ideas, 'tis no wonder an idea of a sentiment or passion, may by this means be enliven'd as to become the very sentiment or passion. The lively idea of any object always approaches its impression; and 'tis certain we may feel sickness and pain from the mere force of imagination, and make a malady real by often thinking of it. But this is most remarkable in the opinions and affections; and 'tis there principally that a lively idea is converted into an impression. Our affections depend more upon ourselves, and the internal operations of the mind, than any other impressions; for which reason they arise more naturally from the imagination, and from every lively idea we form of them. This is the nature and cause of sympathy; and 'tis after this manner we enter so deep into the opinions and affections of others, whenever we discover them.

2.1.11.8 What is principally remarkable in this whole affair is the strong confirmation these phaenomena give to the foregoing system concerning the understanding, and consequently to the present one concerning the passions; since these are analogous to each other. 'Tis indeed evident, that when we sympathize with the passions and sentiments of others, these movements appear at first in our mind as mere ideas, and are conceiv'd to belong to another person, as we conceive any other matter of fact. 'Tis also evident, that the ideas of the affections of others are converted into the very impressions they represent, and that the passions arise in conformity to the images we form of them. All this is an object of the plainest experience, and depends not on any hypothesis of philosophy. That science can only be admitted to explain the phaenomena; tho' at the same time it must be confest, they are so clear of themselves, that there is but little occasion to employ it. For besides the relation of cause and effect, by which we are convinc'd of the reality of the passion, with which we sympathize; besides this, I say, we must be assisted by the relations of resemblance and contiguity, in order to feel the sympathy in its full perfection. And since these relations can entirely convert an idea into an impression, and convey the vivacity of the latter into the former, so perfectly as to lose nothing of it in the transition, we may easily conceive how the relation of cause and effect alone, may serve to strengthen and enliven an idea. In sympathy there is an evident conversion of an idea into an impression. This conversion arises from the relation of objects to ourself. Ourself is always intimately present to us. Let us compare all these circumstances, and we shall find, that sympathy is exactly correspondent to the operations of our understanding; and even contains something more surprizing and extraordinary.

2.1.11.9 'Tis now time to turn our view from the general consideration of sympathy, to its influence on pride and humility, when these passions arise from praise and blame, from reputation and infamy. We may observe, that no person is ever prais'd by another for any quality, which wou'd not, if real, produce, of itself, a pride in the person possess of it. The elogiums either turn upon his power, or riches, or family, or virtue; all of which are subjects of vanity, that we have already explain'd and accounted for. 'Tis certain, then, that if a person consider'd himself in the same light, in which he appears to his admirer, he wou'd first receive a separate pleasure, and afterwards a pride or self-satisfaction, according to the hypothesis above explain'd. Now nothing is more natural than for us to embrace the opinions of others in this particular; both from sympathy, which renders all their sentiments intimately present to us; and from reasoning, which makes us regard their judgment, as a kind of argument for what they affirm. These two principles of authority and sympathy influence almost all our opinions; but must have a peculiar influence, when we judge of our own worth and character. Such judgments are always attended with passion [Book 1, Part 3. Sect. 10.]; and nothing tends more to disturb our understanding, and precipitate us into any opinions, however unreasonable, than their connexion with passion; which diffuses itself over the imagination, and gives an additional force to every related idea. To which we may add, that being conscious of great partiality in our own favour, we are peculiarly pleas'd with any thing, that confirms the good opinion we have of ourselves, and are easily shock'd with whatever opposes it.

2.1.11.10 All this appears very probable in theory; but in order to bestow a full certainty on this reasoning, we must examine the phaenomena of the passions, and see if they agree with it.

2.1.11.11 Among these phaenomena we may esteem it a very favourable one to our present purposes that tho' fame in general be agreeable, yet we receive a much greater satisfaction from the approbation of those, whom we ourselves esteem and approve of, than of those, whom we hate and despise. In like measure we are principally mortify'd with the contempt of persons, upon whose judgment we set some value, and are, in a great measure, indifferent about the opinions of the rest of mankind. But if the mind receiv'd from any original instinct a desire of fame, and aversion to infamy, fame and infamy wou'd influence us without distinction; and every opinion, according as it were favourable or unfavourable, wou'd equally excite that desire or aversion. The judgment of a fool is the judgment of another person, as well as that of a wise man, and is only inferior in its influence on our own judgment.

2.1.11.12 We are not only better pleas'd with the approbation of a wise man than with that of a fool, but receive an additional satisfaction from the former, when 'tis obtained after a long and intimate acquaintance. This is accounted for after the same manner.

2.1.11.13 The praises of others never give us much pleasure, unless they concur with our own opinion, and extol us for those qualities, in which we chiefly excel. A mere soldier little values the character of eloquence: A gownman of courage: A bishop of humour: Or a merchant of learning. Whatever esteem a man may have for any quality, abstractedly consider'd; when he is conscious he is not possess of it; the opinions of the whole world will give him little pleasure in that particular, and that because they never will be able to draw his own opinion after them.

2.1.11.14 Nothing is more usual than for men of good families, but narrow circumstances, to leave their friends and country, and rather seek their livelihood by mean and mechanical employments among strangers, than among those, who are acquainted with their birth and education. We shall be unknown, say they, where we go. No body will suspect from what family we are sprung. We shall be remov'd from all our friends and acquaintance, and our poverty and meanness will by that means sit more easy upon us. In examining these sentiments, I find they afford many very convincing arguments for my present purpose.

2.1.11.15 First, We may infer from them, that the uneasiness of being contemn'd depends on sympathy, and that sympathy depends on the relation of objects to ourselves; since we are most uneasy under the contempt of persons, who are both related to us by blood, and contiguous in place. Hence we seek to diminish this sympathy and uneasiness by separating these relations, and placing ourselves in a contiguity to strangers, and at a distance from relations.

2.1.11.16 Secondly, We may conclude, that relations are requisite to sympathy, not absolutely consider'd as relations, but by their influence in converting our ideas of the sentiments of others into the very sentiments, by means of the association betwixt the idea of their persons, and that of our own. For here the relations of kindred and contiguity both subsist; but not being united in the same persons, they contribute in a less degree to the sympathy.

2.1.11.17 Thirdly, This very circumstance of the diminution of sympathy by the separation of relations is worthy of our attention. Suppose I am plac'd in a poor condition among strangers, and consequently am but lightly treat'd; I yet find myself easier in that situation, than when I was every day expos'd to the contempt of my kindred and countrymen. Here I feel a double contempt; from my relations, but they are absent; from those about me, but they are strangers. This double contempt is likewise strengthen'd by the two relations of kindred and contiguity. But as the persons are not the same, who are connected with me by those two relations, this difference of ideas separates the impressions arising from the contempt, and keeps them from running into each other. The contempt of my neighbours has a certain influence; as has also that of my kindred: But these influences are distinct, and never unite; as when the contempt proceeds from persons who are at once both my neighbours and kindred. This phaenomenon is analogous to the system of pride and humility above-explain'd, which may seem so extraordinary to vulgar apprehensions.

2.1.11.18 Fourthly, A person in these circumstances naturally conceals his birth from those among whom he lives, and is very uneasy, if any one suspects him to be of a family, much superior to his present fortune and way of living. Every thing in this world is judg'd of by comparison. What is an immense fortune for a private gentleman is beggary for a prince. A peasant wou'd think himself happy in what cannot afford necessaries for a gentleman. When a man has either been acustom'd to a more splendid way of living, or thinks himself entitled to it by his birth and quality, every thing below is disagreeable and even shameful; and 'tis with the greatest industry he conceals his pretensions to a better fortune. Here he himself knows his misfortunes; but as those, with whom he lives, are ignorant of them, he has the disagreeable reflection and comparison suggested only by his own thoughts, and never receives it by a sympathy with others; which must contribute very much so his ease and satisfaction.

2.1.11.19 If there be any objections to this hypothesis, that the pleasure, which we receive from praise, arises from a communication of sentiments, we shall find, upon examination, that these objections, when taken in a proper light, will serve to confirm it. Popular fame may be agreeable even to a man, who despises the vulgar; but 'tis because their multitude gives them additional weight and authority. Plagiaries are delighted with praises, which they are conscious they do not deserve; but this is a kind of castle-building, where the imagination amuses itself with its own fictions, and strives to render them firm and stable by a sympathy with the sentiments of others. Proud men are most shock'd with contempt, tho' they do not most readily assent to it; but 'tis because of the opposition betwixt the passion, which is natural so them, and that receiv'd by sympathy. A violent lover in like manner is very much displeas'd when you blame and condemn his love; tho' 'tis evident your opposition can have no influence, but by the hold it takes of himself, and by his sympathy with you. If he despises you, or perceives you are in jest, whatever you say has no effect upon him.